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Ar t i c l es
Asociety almost unanimously in favour of the deathpenalty: such is the image that has become com-monplace in describing China’s attitude to the
question. However this image is too simple not to be mis-
leading. One must therefore question the factors that lead to
this perception of a Chinese “public opinion“ under a polit-
ical regime that does not make possible its formation and ex-
pression in sufficiently open and transparent conditions.
Here we will question opinions relating to the death penalty.
One is struck by the heterogeneousness and ambiguity of
the positions expressed. Does “public opinion” today play a
part in the debates about the death penalty in China? In
seeking to answer this question, we will proceed in three
stages: First we will briefly consider the Chinese notion of
“public opinion” and its ambiguity in political and social
practice in the course of the twentieth century. Secondly, we
will establish its status in the current debate on the death
penalty. In order to do so, we will describe how legal experts
are meeting for the first time with unexpected opposition on
the question of “economic crimes,” and we will analyse the
interpretations of this phenomenon in legal circles. Finally
we will again question the problematic notion of minyi in
such a context, in order to ask ourselves to what extent this
ambiguous reality, variously translated here by the expres-
sions “public opinion” or “popular opinion” (without over-
looking the difference between them), actively contributes to
the construction of a “people’s space” (minjian), which I
provisionally define as an informal space that allows people
to come together temporarily on their own initiative (rather
than on that of the state) in order to take action or to discuss
a certain common interest.
The  notion and evo lution o f
public  opinion
From Western history since the Enlightenment, one gener-
ally retains the idea that public opinion posits a well-defined
social and institutional environment. This environment has
been conceptualised by Jürgen Habermas with his idea of
Oeffenlichkeit, “publicity,” in the sense of a “public space”
that allows free and critical public debate calling for rea-
soned argument. This ideal-type remains a convenient refer-
ence, despite the numerous discussions in political science
and political philosophy around the notion of opinion — from
the well-known debate in the United States between Walter
Lippman and the philosopher John Dewey (1) to the radical
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1. In Public opinion (1922), Walter Lippman deconstructs the misconceptions of the
public in a democratic society about their own environment, for lack of the neces-
sary specialised knowledge. This general ignorance of the public makes possible
the manufacture of a consensus by the elites according to their own interests,
through the media, etc. He therefore defends the role of experts, whom he consid-
ers better able than the ignorant masses to guide the authorities. Against this crit-
icism, Dewey defends his ideal of “participative democracy” (The Public and its
Problems, 1927). He recognises the problems raised by Lippman, but defends the
possibility of the public forming a great community that can be educated about the
real problems, pronounce judgements, and arrive at solutions to social questions.












What role does public opinion play in the present debate over the death penalty in China? Should one settle for an
image of unanimous public support for the death penalty? The starting point of this article is a study of the growing
awareness among Chinese legal experts, during the first decade of the millennium, of the particular role played by
public opinion. Faced with violent opposition to their project to abolish the death penalty for economic crimes, legal
experts share their concerns when confronted with such popular pressures, which can be reminiscent of certain
Maoist practices. Using analyses of certain recent cases, the author seeks to bring out the other dimensions that
make up public opinion, in order to question an idea that is ambiguous and problematical in the context of today’s
China.
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positions of Pierre Bourdieu (2) in France, to whom “there
is no such thing as public opinion.”
The concept of “public opinion” was introduced in China
from the West at the end of the nineteenth century. Be-
fore then, one finds the Chinese idea of yanlu, which con-
ventionally designates the “channels through which criti-
cisms and suggestions can be transmitted to the authori-
ties.” Use of this word goes back to the Han dynasty, (3)
designating the paths and institutions (4) through which the
sovereign received criticism and advice. These practices
and institutions were essentially centred around the person
of the sovereign: they were aimed at the behaviour and
policy of the sovereign only for his own benefit, so that he
might correct his imperfections or his mistakes. One can
consider that this imperial legacy finds a kind of continu-
ation in contemporary China, even if it is in parallel with
the gradual constitution of a public opinion in the modern,
Western sense of the term. Thus an echo of this ancient
practice can be found in Mao Zedong’s decision, as soon
as the People’s Republic was founded, to establish, in
what were of course very new conditions, a system for re-
ceiving “letters and visits” (xinfang), aimed at acquiring a
better knowledge of the opinions of the people. The new
elites, who do not question the legitimacy of the govern-
ment, sometimes resort to this ancient notion in order to
transmit their criticisms in an acceptable form. (5) (See the
note on the studies of Isabelle Thireau on this ques-
tion). (6)
The notion of public opinion in China has a range of
meanings, both because of the number of translations of
the expression and because of evolution in the historical
context. What is really needed here is historical semantic
research. We will simply note that the term chosen in the
nineteenth century to express the modern Western idea
was initially yulun, while minyi refers back to a democratic
context and expresses the people’s will. (Mao however,
used “renmin de yiyuan“ to designate the will of a “peo-
ple” conceived according to communist ideology.) Today
the terms minyi and yulun are generally accepted as stan-
dard translations of the concept of public opinion originat-
ing in the modern West. It seems clear, in any case, that
this notion in its original sense could not exist in Mao’s
time: the Party was the one and only organ capable of col-
lecting the opinion of the masses and translating it into po-
litical action. Most of the time, this idea therefore refers
to a perspective that is both more limited and more instru-
mental, that of a “popular” opinion aroused, selected, or
controlled by the political powers and the guardians of ide-
ology. Mao, in his own language, distinguished the “peo-
ple’s will” (renmin de yiyuan) from opinion (yulun). The
former had a positive meaning, while the latter was more
pejorative.
This distinction is in reality profoundly linked to the no-
tion of “people” as Mao defined it. As he saw it, “the
people in today’s China includes the following classes: the
workers, the peasants, the urban petit bourgeois and the
national bourgeoisie.” (7) This definition is reproduced in
the first constitutional text of the People’s Republic of
China. It serves as the main criterion for distinguishing be-
tween two political concepts: that of “people” (renmin)
and that of “subject” (guomin). As explained by Zhou
Enlai, the difference between these two concepts is the
following: “All the Chinese are subjects of China. But
they do not all belong to the category of the people. The
people include the majority of Chinese who enjoy the
rights and liberties as defined by the Common Pro-
gramme of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference and by other legal measures. Subjects who
are excluded from the people do not enjoy these rights,
but they must observe duties and obligations.” (8) In order
to avoid such an overtly ideological position being in-
scribed in the new Constitution, Zhou Enlai and Liu
Shaoqi proposed that the concept of “subject” (guomin)
be replaced by the notion of “citizen” (gongmin). The lat-
ter, which is purely legal, includes the two previous cate-
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2. Pierre Bourdieu, “L’opinion publique n’existe pas” (1972), in Questions de sociologie, Mi-
nuit, 1984, pp. 222-235.
3. The term “dujue yanlu“ (obstructing the channels of criticism and suggestion) is used to
criticise Cao Cao, Houhanshu. Yuan Shao zhuan (Biography of Yuan Shao), j.74 a, Bei-
jing, Zhonghua shuju, 1974, p. 2396.
4. Pierre-Etienne Will, “Le contrôle de l’excès de pouvoir sous la dynastie des Ming,” in
Mireille Delmas-Marty et al. (eds.), La Chine et la démocratie, Paris, Fayard, 2007, pp.
111-158 (131).
5. See Wen Renzhu, “Yanlu yu weiwen zhi xilie tan” (discussion on the link between open-
ing channels to popular criticism and the maintenance of social order), 30 July 2009,
http://bbs.book.sina.com.cn/thread-9-0/table-831645-5482.html, accessible 9 Sep-
tember 2009; Zhao Yongfeng, “Jingti ‘feibang zui zusai yanlu” (Be careful not to use ac-
cusations of defamation for the expression of popular criticism), 9 April 2009,
http://shiping.cctv.com/20090409/103631.shtml.
6. “Faire référence à la parole du pouvoir.” See also Isabelle Thireau and Hua Linshan, Les
Ruses de la démocratie. Contester en Chine contemporaine, Paris, Seuil, 2010; “‘Faire
appel auprès du pouvoir public.‘ Une nouvelle épreuve de justice en Chine et ses trans-
formations,“ in Les sens du public. Publics politiques, publics médiatiques, Daniel Cefaï
et al., Paris, PUF, 2003, pp. 137-156.
7. Mao Zedong, “Lun renmin minzhu zhuanzheng” (On the democratic dictatorship of the
People), Mao Zedong xuanji, Beijing, Renmin chubanshe, 1964, j.4, p. 1475.
8. Zhou Enlai, “Gongtong gangling cao’an qicao de jingguo he gangling de tedian” (The
process of elaboration of the project of the Common Programme and its characteristics),
22 September 1949, quoted by Xu Chongde, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa shi (A
history of the Constitutions of the People’s Republic of China), Fuzhou, Fujian renmin
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gories and corresponds better with constitutional terminol-
ogy. In reality, despite Mao’s doubts, (9) it was finally incor-
porated into the Constitution of 1954.
Despite this conceptual compromise, the political definition
of the “people” still remained operational and central to the
practice of the Maoist regime. The concept evolved accord-
ing to the redefinition of the enemy carried out by the CCP
during successive political campaigns, all through the Maoist
era. The situation only changed under Deng Xiaoping: the
return to legality gradually caused the figure of the political
enemy in society to fade, to be replaced by that of the crim-
inal. This is a profound change, for it allows a society that
was once submerged by politics to live at last within the
framework of the law. A society dominated by ideology rests
on the concept of the enemy, which is relative, creative, and
dialectic, and allows adjustment according to circumstances,
while a society subject to the law rests on the concept of
crime, a notion that is concrete, stable, and legally circum-
scribed.
This experience of the Maoist era continues to produce its
effects in a China that has become relatively more “depoliti-
cised” today: practices linked to the notion of “minyi ” are
still marked by the imperial and Maoist political legacies.
But with the emergence of the Internet in the last few years,
particularly since 2003, public opinion is beginning to play a
new role, carrying out a not inconsiderable function of con-
trol, in particular in debates about the death penalty.
The  emergence of  “publ ic  
opinion”  in  debates  about 
the death penalty
Discussion of the death penalty in China began first in the
specialised circle of Chinese jurists around the year 2000.
One can now observe the coexistence of a minority who call
for abolition of the penalty with a majority who seek to pro-
mote both rationalisation and restriction of the death
penalty.
Over the last few years, this situation has developed in a
new way with the widening of the debate to sections of pub-
lic opinion that express themselves either locally, on the oc-
casion of a particular case, or nationally, in particular on var-
ious Internet sites. The eruption of a public opinion that is
overwhelmingly hostile to abolitionist policy has obliged the
circle of jurists to take into account this unexpected opposi-
tion, coming from the base and not the pinnacle of society.
To give an idea of the degree of violence reached by this de-
bate, I will quote the words of a certain Zhu Zhongqing,
who posted on the Internet in January 2006 a text entitled
“International declaration against the abolitionist trend.”
This internaut opposes abolitionism on the grounds that it
contradicts human rights if one takes into account the rights
of victims: “Treating criminals humanely is in effect tolerat-
ing the inhumanity that they have shown their victims. More-
over, this penalty is rooted in human nature, and expresses
a desire for reparation that is legitimate.” The anti-elitist at-
titude of this text is interesting. I quote:
The abolitionist movements that are widespread in
the world today are all led by politicians and elites
against the public will (minyi). This policy, which is
imposed on the masses by the elites in jurist circles,
is by nature anti-democratic. Respecting the masses is
a basic necessity of democracy; the right to legislative
decision must be taken in hand by the masses, and
the elites of the legislative apparatus should dispose
only of a right to propose with the aim of assisting the
people in the elaboration of the laws instead of want-
ing to carry it out as they please. To lead the led
against their will is in fact to ‘kidnap’ them
(bangjia)! (10)
For  and against  the  aboli t ion-
i st  project  in  r elation to 
“economic c rimes”
In the middle of the 2000s, Chinese legal circles felt they
were on favourable ground when they raised the possibility
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9. One can see that Article 16 of the draft of this Constitution stipulates that the People’s
Republic of China protects the people’s democratic system, and defends the security
and legal rights of all citizens (…). However, Mao asks the following question: “What is
the citizen (gongmin)?” Li Weihan then explains that “the notion of citizen, as defined in
the Constitution, includes all people who have Chinese nationality.” Deng Xiaoping
comes down in favour of the replacement of “quanti renmin“ by that of “quanti gong-
min“; and Liu Shaoqi specifies: “the citizen here designates what in the past was called
‘renmin‘ (the people) and ‘guomin‘ (the subjects or nationals). Landowners are also part
of the citizens, it is simply that they are citizens who have been deprived of political
rights. If we mention only ‘the people,‘ this category of subjects or guomin will be nec-
essarily excluded.” See Xu Chongde, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa shi, op cit., p.
176, 195.
10. Six arguments listed in this text reproduce those that have often been put forward by
the anti-abolitionists: “1) Abolition of the death penalty in reality runs counter to human
rights, if one considers in particular victims’ rights; 2) abolition is in fact inhumane, be-
cause to treat criminals humanely is to tolerate the inhumanity that they have shown to
their victims; 3) abolition is contrary to human nature, because the desire for vengeance
is part of human nature. The death penalty expresses a demand for redress in the name
of the fundamental interests of humanity; 4) the abolitionist position is in reality contrary
to democracy; 5) the death penalty is a heavy penalty but it is not cruel; 6) abolitionism
flies in the face of the historical trend in favour of values such as democracy, human
rights, humanity, and justice.” Zhu Zhongqing, “Guoji fan feichu sixing yundong xu-
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of abolishing the death penalty in the case of “economic
crimes.” Indeed, the debates carried out for legislative pur-
poses on the necessity for rationalising a particularly chaotic
penal procedure had already produced some results, even if
they were still limited. The most remarkable was undoubt-
edly the return to the Supreme People’s Court, in January
2007, of the power to review death sentences. The fact that
a new concept, that of “economic crimes,“ had gradually
come to the fore in numerous debates provided jurists with
new grounds to revive their abolitionist project.
The recognition in the 1980s of this new penal category is
indeed evidence of progress in relation to the Maoist era.
Crimes relating to the economy were then defined as
counter-revolutionary behaviour, and therefore as political
in nature. Deng Xiaoping’s reform reintegrated “economic
crimes” into the law. Despite this effort towards depolitici-
sation, a “judicial” habitus formed by Maoism nevertheless
continues to mark all penal policy relating to this kind of
crime, which is increasing steadily. The “Decision of the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on
the severe punishment of criminals who seriously under-
mine the economy” is an example of this. Passed by the
National People’s Congress on 8 March 1982, and coming
into effect on 1 April the same year, it aimed to complete
the Penal Code of 1979 and to reinforce severity towards
criminal economic acts such as “the act of seeking to ob-
tain exorbitant profits through smuggling, the illicit pur-
chase of foreign currency and speculation, the theft of pub-
lic property, the theft and sale of old and precious objects
and the extortion and acceptance of bribes.” (11) These of-
fences henceforth come under various categories of of-
fences defined in the Penal Code as “undermining the so-
cialist economic order” (Chapter III), “undermining prop-
erty” (Chapter V), “disrupting the administrative manage-
ment of society” (shehui guanli zhixu) (Chapter VI), and
“neglecting the duties one is entrusted with” (Chapter
VIII). (12) In the framework of a circumstantial criminal pol-
icy, all these offences were subject to the death penalty.
Since the application of these laws implies arbitrary behav-
iour inherited from the Maoist era, it is now objected to by
most jurists.
In 2006, Zho Bingzhi (13) and Wan Yunfeng, (14) having car-
ried out a study aimed at redefining “economic crimes”
more strictly, found that 19 of these crimes committed with-
out the use of violence were still subject to the death penalty.
They amount to over a quarter (27.94 percent) of all death
sentences and almost half (43.18 percent) of those sen-
tenced without having made any use of violence. (15) In their
proposal addressed to the legislators, the two authors defend
their project of complete abolition of the death penalty in
cases of economic crimes. Their arguments can be sum-
marised as follows: 1) On a theoretical level, it is necessary
to abolish the application of this sentence to economic
crimes because of the lack of legitimacy of the notion of ret-
ribution (baoying gengju shang de queshi); 2) on a practical
level, its application lacks both dissuasive and preventative
effectiveness; 3) finally, by their nature, these crimes are
more amenable than others to an abolitionist position.
I quote the last two arguments because of the discrepancy
they reveal between the perceptions of jurists and those of
sections of public opinion.
Despite numerous laws concerning the application of
the death penalty to economic crimes, their effective-
ness is unsatisfactory: first of all, various crimes of an
economic kind do not diminish with the increase in
the number of death sentences: on the contrary they
continue to increase (…) For example, in 2001, there
were 847 cases of smuggling (zousi) tried in the coun-
try as a whole, an increase of 122 percent over 2001;
4,740 cases concerning the production and trafficking
of counterfeit money, an increase of 12.14 percent
over the previous year; 17,931 people were sen-
tenced for corruption, among whom were three
cadres at the ministerial and provincial level, 52
cadres at the prefectural and departmental level and
350 cadres at the district level (16) (…) This is enough
to demonstrate that the preventive and dissuasive
function of the death penalty is extremely limited in
the case of economic crimes (…)
88
N o  2 0 1 0 / 1
11. “Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress regarding the
severe punishment of criminals who seriously undermine the economy,” in The Criminal
Law and the Criminal Procedure Law of China, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1984,
p. 229.
12. Ibid., p. 8.
13. Doctor and Professor in Legal Sciences, Zhao Bingzhi is Director of the Institute of Stud-
ies on Legal Science and Criminal Law at Beijing Normal University and President of the
Association of Criminal Studies in the National Association of Legal Studies. He is also
vice-president of the Chinese branch of the International Association of Criminal Jurists.
14. Doctor in Legal Sciences, Wan Yunfeng is a judge in the People’s Intermediate Court in
municipality of Canton.
15. Zhao Bingzhi and Wan Yunfeng, “On the limitation and abolition of the death penalty ap-
plied to economic crimes,” in Zhao Bingzhi, (ed.), Sixing zhidu zhi xianshi kaocha yu
wanshan jianyan (Investigation and legislative Perfection on the Death Penalty), Beijing,
Zhongguo renmin gong’an daxue chubanshe, 2006, pp. 293-312.
16. There are five major levels of cadres in today’s Chinese administration: 1) leaders of the
Party and the government (dang he guojia lingdaoren); 2) the level of ministries and
provinces (shengbuji); 3) the level of prefectures and departments (ditingji); 4) the level
of districts, which is also equivalent to a section (xianchuji), and 5) the lowest level,
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The same is true in the case of corruption. Follow-
ing the death sentences passed on Liu Qingshan
and Zhang Zishan (17) at the beginning of the regime,
the death penalty was rarely applied to this kind of
case under Mao. It was only beginning with the time
of the reforms that the number of crimes found in
the category of corruption gradually increased, par-
ticularly in the last few years. Thus, following the
death sentence passed on Guan Zhicheng, formerly
secretary general of the CCP at the General Steel
Company in Beijing, three other criminals guilty of
corruption in the same company were discovered;
following the execution of Hu Changqing, former
vice-governor of the province of Jiangxi, other digni-
taries such as Cheng Kejie, former vice-president of
the Standing Committee of the People’s National
Congress, Li Zhen, former director of the Tax Of-
fice of Hebei Province, and Wang Huaizhong, for-
mer vice-governor of Anhui Province, were succes-
sively sentenced to death for corruption. A few
dozen senior government officials also guilty of cor-
ruption, such as Liu Fangren, former secretary gen-
eral of the Party in Guizhou Province, and Zhang
Guogang, former vice-governor of the province of
Hubei, were punished one after the other. (18)
In order to demonstrate that this abolitionist project is fea-
sible, the authors borrow an argument from Lu Jianping: (19)
Economic crimes committed without the use of vio-
lence do not display the visible, immoral, and cruel
character that characterises violent crimes; more-
over, the social damage they cause is above all ex-
pressed in figures, which are relatively abstract and
therefore do not so easily provoke popular feel-
ing. (20)
Many jurists who share this point of view occasionally ex-
press themselves in public. Thus, He Weifang, professor at
Peking University and a supporter of the abolition of the
death penalty, (21) on the occasion of “National Promotion
of Rule of Law Day,” 4 December 2006, published an ar-
ticle in Nanjing zhoumo (Nanjing Weekly). In this text,
entitled “The death penalty is not dissuasive in preventing
crime” the author wrote:
Economic crimes such as corruption and accepting
bribes belong to the category of crimes against prop-
erty. Such people do not seek to attack human life
and have not committed violent crimes such as
arson, murder, or looting. What they seek is to ap-
propriate money illegally. When someone is con-
demned to death for a sizeable sum of money, it
comes down to valuing human life in monetary
terms: it seems to me that this is to place money
above human life. In my opinion, the best way to
punish these people is to deprive them of money so
that they suffer for the rest of their lives from depri-
vation of what they love. But is it reasonable to de-
prive them of life?
Rather than establishing good systems beforehand,
we only seek to punish afterwards and to vent our
anger on corrupt cadres. This can temporarily
soothe people’s indignation, but it is not a long-term
solution. We should improve institutions instead of
reinforcing superstitious attitudes about the death
penalty. (22)
As early as 2004, this abolitionist project had provoked ve-
hement reactions in public opinion: these jurists were ac-
cused of being “hypocritical moralists” or of being of the
“same species as the corrupt cadres.” (23) In 2007 this kind
of reaction in the media increased and became even more
explicit.
When He Weifang’s text was published at the end of
2006, an internaut confronted him and challenged him to
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17. This was the most famous case of the condemning to death of corrupt cadres that re-
sulted from the “three antis” campaign at the end of 1951. See Bo Yibo, Ruogan
zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu (A retrospective of some decisions and of important
events), Beijing, Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2008, vol.1, pp. 105-108.
18. Zhao Bingzhi and Wan Yunfeng, “On the limitation and abolition of the death penalty ap-
plied to economic crimes,” op. cit., pp. 307-308.
19. Born in 1963, Doctor in Legal Sciences Lu Jianping is Professor of Law and Deputy Di-
rector of the Institute of Legal Studies and of Criminal Law at Beijing Normal University.
He is also Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Council of the Association of Criminal
Studies in the National Association of Legal Studies of China and Deputy Secretary and
Executive Member of the International Association of Criminal Jurists.
20. Lu Jianping, “Shilun zhongguo feibaoli fanzui sixing de feizhi“ (On the abolition of the
death penalty applied to non-violent crimes), in Zhao Bingzhi (ed.), Zhongguo feizhi six-
ing zhilu tansuo (Discussion of the paths towards the abolition of the death penalty in
China), Beijing, Zhongguo renmin gong’an daxue, 2004, p. 47. 
21. Born in 1960 in Shandong, He Weifang is Professor of Law at Peking University, editor
of the journal Zhongwai faixue (Chinese and Foreign Legal Studies), and Vice President
of the Association for Historical Study of Foreign Law and of the Association for Com-
parative Law Studies in the National Association of Legal Sciences. He is known for his
positions in defence of human rights in China and for his courage in criticising the pres-
ent legal system.
22. He Weifang, “Sixing nanyi zhenshe fanzui,” Nanjing zhoumo, 7 December 2006. 
23. Li Weihua, “Toushi sixing cunfei zhizheng“ (An analysis of the debate on the mainte-
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prove his assertion about the lack of dissuasive effect of the
death penalty. Above all, he defended the idea that the
penalty is a response to the justified “indignation” of pub-
lic opinion: the people can be wrong, but it is wrong to con-
sider them as necessarily irrational. (24)
After the publication in Xinxi shibao (Information Times)
by a certain Yan Tao of an article entitled “China must
cease applying the death penalty to economic crimes,” reac-
tion was swift. Thus, a certain Zhao Yong published a short
article entitled “It is not yet time to talk blithely of abolish-
ing the death penalty for economic crimes” in Xinxi shibao
(Modern Information). Liu Min and Li Yueming posted ar-
ticles on the Internet respectively entitled “To abolish the
death penalty for economic crimes is to tolerate them,” and
“How can anyone say that there is no connection between
the question of the maintenance or the abolition of the
death penalty for economic crimes and the fight against cor-
ruption?” (25)
Among the various reactions of public opinion, I will men-
tion one case that seems to me to be representative. An in-
ternaut gives his contribution the following title: “Should the
right to life of corrupt cadres come before the economic
losses caused by their corruption?” He attacks the position
of principle taken by jurists who oppose the execution of
cadres found guilty of the embezzlement of particularly large
sums of money. He deems pretentious and hollow the argu-
ment according to which “referring to the economic value of
the goods embezzled in order to assess the value of human
life is to devalue this human life itself.” He expresses his in-
dignation thus:
Peasants in Hunan Province sell their blood in order
to survive, and those who are infected with AIDS
are deprived of means of treatment and leave or-
phans behind. The unemployed and poor peasants
commit suicide because they have no way of paying
for the studies of their children who have gained en-
trance to university. As for the corrupt cadres, one
sees them pitilessly monopolising the wealth that
could save all these lives. Is not failing to take eco-
nomic logic into account in cracking down on crime
also to deny all value to the life of the poor popula-
tion?
He also rejects the jurists’ argument on the non-dissuasive
character of the death penalty in economic matters: Chair-
man Mao “punished corrupt cadres with severity and with-
out pity (…) Such an application of the death penalty made
it possible to make corrupt senior cadres in China disappear
for 20 years.” (26)
Jurists such as Chen Xingliang show their sensitivity to the
objections coming from the lower reaches of society, accord-
ing to which, under cover of abstract principles, abolitionism
in economic matters could favour the powerful and perpetu-
ate inequality. He therefore reprints that internaut’s text in
the editorial of a special edition about the death penalty, but
adds the following comments:
The question of corruption is closely linked to the po-
litical regime and to the power structure in particular.
While penalties, including the death penalty, can play
a certain role in controlling corruption, they cannot
cut out the evil at the root. [Moreover], the phenom-
enon of corruption linked to the social conditions of a
market economy does not have the same characteris-
tics as in a planned economy. Today, even if we were
to kill a hundred high officials like Liu Qingshan, that
would not be enough to solve the problem of corrup-
tion. The mixture of a superstitious value attributed to
the death penalty and of a fierce hatred of corruption
is the origin of particularly irrational reasoning. If we
do not provide any clarification on the subject, it will
be impossible in China to restrict or even abolish the
death penalty in the short term. (27)
The  thinking  of  juris ts  on 
publi c  opinion
In the professional milieu of law specialists, we are witness-
ing a gradual taking into account of the tension between the
judiciary and what is called public or popular opinion
(minyi). This tension is now sufficiently obvious for the
media to question jurists on the subject. Chen Xingliang
states in particular:
Popular opinion has its own limitations. It is inevitably
characterised by irrational and emotional aspects.
Moreover, the support of public opinion always pres-
ents a particular rather than a general aspect: the sup-
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port that was expressed for Wang Binyu (28) (a worker
found guilty of murder committed in order to avenge
the unjust behaviour of his employer) is in fact the
opinion of the media and of the internauts, and is dif-
ferent from real public opinion. If the judiciary takes
account only of this kind of opinion, this will inevitably
create an iniquitous situation because (…) the major-
ity of similar cases were not reported in the media and
did not therefore attract the attention of society.
He thus emphasises the danger of such a situation: “The
media will influence the judgement, and people will seek out
journalists instead of lawyers when there are legal problems.
This is quite clearly not a normal situation under the rule of
law.” (29)
The interventions of another law professor, Lu Jianping, are
also interesting in that he recognises explicitly, in the present
usage of the notion of minyi (public or popular opinion), a
more or less conscious legacy of the Maoist notion of min-
fen (popular indignation). Now we know the role allowed to
that kind of “popular indignation” in the procedures of “jus-
tice by the masses” (qunzhong sifa): this notion served as le-
gitimation for the expeditious application of the death
penalty during various political campaigns in the past, and as
political manipulation of public opinion, in particular the
anger of the people, while minimising the role of the legal
system. It is therefore useful for us to resituate these two dis-
tinct but closely connected notions in their historical context.
Originating in the internal purges of the CCP carried out in
Jiangxi in the 1930s, “judicial practice by the masses” then
developed in Yan’an, which had become the Communists’
main base. It then extended into rural society during the
agricultural reforms launched in the areas progressively con-
quered by the CCP. Finally it was introduced into the na-
tional legal system, particularly in the cities, during the
1950s, in the course of successive political campaigns. Car-
ried out first in the name of the Party, then in the name of
the people, this judicial practice generally consisted of organ-
ising meetings of denunciation with incitement to ideological
hatred, which made possible torture and collective violence,
and ended with a “trial by the masses,” making it possible in
a performative manner to pass a verdict, and then to execute
the accused. In this operation, the mobilisation of the emo-
tions of the people was a central dimension, without which
this kind of judicial practice would hardly be distinguishable,
on a formal level, from other kinds of trials. To illustrate it,
we select here a typical example of this practice, which took
place in Shanghai in March 1952, during the campaign of
the “three antis” (aimed a fighting corruption, waste, and
bureaucratism). (30) Towards the last stage of this campaign of
rectification, in March 1952, with the aim of obtaining spec-
tacular results, all the people’s courts of the “three antis”
(sanfan renmin fating) (31) summoned shopkeepers without
any formalities and subjected them to massive torture in
order to extract confessions. Thus the Shanghai No. 2 print-
works summoned Bao Xintai, a salesman in a hardware
shop, and ordered him to kneel while pulling him by his coat
and his hair. He was forced to admit his crime in writing,
which was supposedly having paid bribes to Communist
cadres. Elsewhere, the Tax Office of Jiangning District sum-
moned Bai Jianhua, a local shop owner. He was slapped
until he passed out. As soon as he recovered he was accused
of pretending to be dead and he was beaten with a stick. An-
other shop owner, He Runquan, was struck by three of the
Office’s employees in turn for an hour and a half. The Tax
Office of Gaoqiao District locked the shop owner Li Jun-
rong in a large room, where ten people beat him up and
stabbed his fingers with a needle…. The People’s Bank sum-
moned and held captive the president of the board of man-
agement of the Diesel Company of China for two weeks and
refused to release him. (32)
This “judicial practice by the masses,” organised and encour-
aged by the CCP at the beginning of the establishment of
the regime, continued under Mao, despite attempts to return
to constitutional practice supported by certain Communist
leaders and by the majority of the important members of the
democratic parties who formed part of the government be-
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tween 1954 and 1956. At the worst times, there arose in var-
ious provinces during the Cultural Revolution “supreme
courts of poor and middle poor peasants” who assumed the
right to judge and execute individuals in the name of the
people in the villages. (33)
In this practice, the notion of “popular indignation” elabo-
rated by Mao in the early 1950s served as a justification to
apply the death penalty and to distinguish between immedi-
ate application and a death sentence with a two-year stay of
execution. (34) I quote from the first text in which this notion
is highlighted officially as a legal reference:
The Central Committee has decided to distinguish,
among the counter-revolutionaries unmasked within
the Party, the People’s Liberation Army, the People’s
Government, in education, commerce and industry, in
religious circles, in the democratic parties, and in the
People’s Associations, between those who deserve to
be executed and those who do not deserve death, but
must be punished by imprisonment (temporary or for
life), or controlled by the masses. We should kill only
those who have created a blood debt, committed seri-
ous crimes by provoking the indignation of the masses
such as raping several women or looting or causing se-
rious damage to the state. To the others we will apply
only the death penalty with a two-year stay of execu-
tion (…) As for counter-revolutionaries in rural areas,
we must kill only those who must be sentenced to
death in order to soothe popular indignation. Ab-
solutely nobody must be killed against the wishes of
the people (…) killing must be carried out in conform-
ity with the wishes of the people with the aim of sooth-
ing their indignation and encouraging production. (35)
Given that the aim was to arouse collective hatred in the
masses, it is not surprising that during the campaign to re-
press counter-revolutionaries launched by Mao on 10 Octo-
ber 1950, many death sentences pronounced during mass
trials concerned local tyrants, ordinary thieves, and rapists
rather than political enemies. The accessible files in the mu-
nicipality of Shanghai (36) show that many criminal cases that
had already been heard were subjected to heavier sentences
in accordance with the following directives from Mao: 1) the
number of death sentences was fixed by Mao himself: as he
saw it, “In a large city like Shanghai one or two thousand
people should be executed during 1951 in order to solve the
problem. It is absolutely necessary to kill between two and
five hundred people in the spring in order to curb the inso-
lence of the enemy and reinforce the morale of the peo-
ple”; (37) 2) the masses must be mobilised and denunciation
meetings organised (suku dahui): indeed, it was more diffi-
cult to mobilise the masses and arouse collective hatred in
the cities than in the villages using ideological slogans, be-
cause the acts of political enemies were not perceived suffi-
ciently concretely to fuel the hatred of the urban population;
consequently, local authorities were sometimes obliged to
change the sentence in certain cases that had already been
heard, in order to achieve this political objective.
This notion of “popular indignation” continues to significantly
influence legislation relating to the death penalty, and even its
application today. Although it appears only in the special crim-
inal laws such as the “Decision of the Standing Committee of
the National People’s Congress concerning the rapid trial pro-
cedure against criminals who seriously disturb public security”
passed on 2 September 1983, (38) its role in the application of
this penalty is constantly observed and criticised by jurists.
Thus Chen Xingliang, during a debate at Peking University
on 13 May 2004, spelt out the problem in the following terms:
There is a well-known expression that makes the rounds
in this country, which is that “we must kill in order to
soothe public indignation.” Although it is not a legal
term that appears in the Penal Code, for a long time this
expression has played an important part in the verdicts
in cases subject to the death penalty. The use of this ex-
pression shows that popular opinion serves as a justifica-
tion in the application of the death penalty; in other
words, public opinion gives the death penalty its moral
legitimacy and its character of “political justice.“ (39)
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The majority of jurists who favour the restriction and even-
tual abolition of the death penalty perceive in this notion
today two contradictory elements, referred to by some as the
“two faces of popular indignation” (minfen de liangzhang
lian): on the one hand it represents a certain spontaneous
sentiment in favour of just retribution, but on the other, as
what is called “collective awareness” (jiti yishi) or  “public
feeling” (gongzhong qinggan), it has an irrational, emo-
tional, and occasionally hysterical dimension. (40) To these ex-
perts, it is the latter aspect that calls for the vigilance of a
reasonable legislator.
This thinking in fact expresses a common perception among
jurists, that of a judicial apparatus that is caught in a pincer
movement from above and below: to the ideological inter-
ventions of the government is added the constant possibility
of the mobilisation of a “public opinion” more or less manip-
ulated by the same government. Liang Genlin, in a lecture
on “Public recognition, political choice, and the limitation of
the death penalty,” emphasises the following:
Politicians have to take public opinion into account,
respect it, and represent it, but they must also steer it
in a reasonable direction. What needs to be empha-
sised is that democracy is not the same thing as pop-
ulism. This is why one must not blindly follow public
opinion and passively surrender to its demands. (41)
Consequently, the argument of jurists who support a restric-
tion of the death penalty (before its possible abolition) needs
to be heard on two fronts: against the government (deemed
by some to be guanyi), which has remained favourable to ex-
ceptional measures that go beyond the prescriptions of the
Penal Code and the spirit of the law (fayi), but also against
the “people,” or rather against the forces that present them-
selves as being “popular” but which, in the absence of the
rule of law, are more populist than “democratic.”
This difficult situation was confirmed on 10 April 2008, during
a speech by Wang Shengjun, the new president of the Supreme
People’s Court. (42) During an inspection tour of Shenzhen, he
listed the three conditions necessary for the application of the
death penalty in China today: 1) it must be applied according
to the law; 2) the general situation of public security must be
taken into account; 3) lastly, one must base oneself on the per-
ception and the feelings of society and of the masses. (43) This
last condition immediately gave rise to reactions in the media,
and particularly from jurists. In an interview with Nandu
zhoukan on 18 April 2008, He Weifang criticised the state-
ment of the new president of the Supreme Court as “not being
in accordance with the idea of the modern rule of law.” Strongly
opposed to this idea, the jurist challenged him in the following
terms:
The assessment by judges of popular sentiment and of
the local situation where public security is concerned
varies according to the perception of each individual,
and it can sometimes be influenced by differences in
regional crime rates. If one were to follow these per-
ceptions subject to regional variation, one would vio-
late the principle of equality before the law. Public
opinion is difficult to measure. Modern society is plu-
ralist by nature, and each individual has their own
opinion on a given question (…) Opinion about crim-
inality can be influenced by highly complex factors.
For example the tone and the manner used by an in-
former to describe a case can suffice to suggest com-
pletely different versions: the same person can be de-
scribed as an abominable criminal who deserves to
die in order to soothe popular indignation or can be
presented as someone who deserves compassion (…)
Today public opinion expressed on the Internet is
even more variable, complex, and difficult to assess
(…) Public opinion is never stable.
One of the criteria on which to judge the existence of
the rule of law is precisely to see if justice can be in-
dependent of public opinion. When justice depends
on public opinion, we are in the situation of the mass
trial where everyone raises their hands and adopts a
decision by acclamation. That is terrifying. China still
finds itself in a situation where the level of profession-
alisation in the judicial field remains very low. Among
200,000 judges, only 20 percent have had profes-
sional training.
The proper functioning of the legal system often de-
pends on freedom of speech and the free circulation of
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public opinion. These are the best means of keeping an
eye on the judiciary (…) The main reason why a judge
in China is often in an untenable position, caught as he
is in the crossfire, is not due to too much media open-
ness but to the lack of independence of the judiciary. In
the case of Zhang Jinzhu, the wrongdoer was the polit-
ical commissar of a Public Security Bureau in
Zhengzhou. He ran into one person, causing his death,
and injured another, after having had too much to drink.
Although the majority of jurists opposed his death sen-
tence, he was unable to escape it. Before his execution,
Zhang said that he had in fact been condemned by the
media. In reality, this is not true. Rather it was in re-
sponse to media reports that the authorities officially de-
cided in favour of a severe punishment. It is the deter-
mination of the authorities that puts so much pressure
on the court; that is the gist of the problem. The same
problem arose in the case of Liu Yong.
The judicial field is elitist by nature. However, in a
democratic regime it is controlled by public opinion.
The latter creates something like a general atmos-
phere and influences the verdict to some extent. The
judiciary takes due note of public opinion, most often
at the moment when the laws are drawn up. That is
the fundamental point. It is the legislative institutions
that can act as the echo of public opinion. They make
it possible to give the latter accurate expression. (44)
This statement emphasises the problematic nature of the
role played by public opinion: it plays a minor part in the leg-
islative process but has a not inconsiderable influence at cer-
tain decisive moments in the application of the law.
Another  s ide of  publi c  opinion
One cannot but understand the aspiration of the world of
professional jurists towards greater independence and a
greater rationalisation of the judiciary. Nonetheless, careful
examination of the popular mobilisations when death sen-
tences are passed produces a more nuanced contrast be-
tween a professional and rational elite, and a necessarily
emotive and irrational public opinion. I will give one or two
examples of this.
The case of She Xianglin is worthy of our attention here, as
the tragedy that befell him had a great impact because of the
numerous interviews with the accused and with his family
that appeared in newspapers and on television. Here is a
summary of the case: In 1994, She’s wife, who suffered from
mental problems, suddenly disappeared. Shortly afterwards,
the body of a woman whose face has been rendered unrecog-
nisable was discovered. The wife’s family suspected the hus-
band of having eliminated her and mobilised 220 people who
signed a petition demanding an immediate execution. (45) The
municipal court of first instance sentenced him to death. The
evidence was nevertheless sufficiently scanty to give rise to a
series of appeals, at the end of which the sentence was re-
duced, four years later, to 15 years’ imprisonment. In 2005,
however, Mr. She’s wife reappeared, whereupon he was de-
clared innocent and was paid compensation by the state.
This case shows two different aspects of the role of the so-
called minyi. At first, the sentencing to death of an innocent
man was due above all to the pressure of the local population,
mobilised by the family of the presumed victim. On the prin-
ciple that “any killer deserves to be killed,” a petition was ad-
dressed to the local court. Considerable pressure was brought
to bear on the judicial and police apparatus. But subsequently
the publicity given to this case led to the highlighting of cer-
tain faults in the criminal apparatus in China. Not only is the
onus on the accused to prove his innocence, but the extortion
of confessions by torture generally plays a disproportionate
role. This practice is theoretically forbidden by the penal pro-
cedure legislation, (46) but in reality, the prosecution does not
bring a case without a confession, and without a confession
the judges do not decide on a sentence. The joint effect of
these two practices is to encourage the use of torture. The
family of the unfortunate Mr. She described the state he was
in after being questioned: he was covered in wounds, and had
a broken finger. He himself later stated on television that he
had had to “confess” to no less than four different versions of
his crime, after having been subjected to long interrogations
without food, water, or sleep.
Thus, while it was “popular indignation” that first expressed
itself in local demonstrations, a movement of sympathy
emerged on the level of the provincial and national media.
Relayed by the family and supporters of the accused, this
movement was able to encourage critical thinking about the
abuses of the penal system.
A more recent and even more spectacular case is that of
Yang Jia, a 28-year-old Beijinger. Groundlessly accused of
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stealing a bicycle on his first trip to Shanghai in 2007, Yang
was subjected to six hours of interrogation. On his return to
Beijing he continued to demand justice but came up against
the obstructions of the police. Finally he returned to Shang-
hai in June 2008. On 1 July 2008, at the main office of the
district police of Zhabei, he attacked 11 policemen, killing six
and wounding five others. Yang Jia was sentenced to death
by the intermediate People’s Court of the municipality of
Shanghai for intentional homicide at the first trial on 1 Sep-
tember that year, but when his appeal was heard, over a thou-
sand people expressed their support outside the court. He
suddenly took on the stature of a popular hero. His declara-
tion “If you won’t do justice to me, I will do it to you!” be-
came an endlessly repeated slogan on the Web. (47) A section
of public opinion supported the young man and questioned
the version of events put forward by the police during the trial
and after the execution of Yang Jia on 26 November: Why
did the young man exact such vengeance after a “normal and
legal investigation”? Why did the Shanghai police go to Bei-
jing to negotiate with him after receiving his complaints
against the police who had interrogated him if Yang had
sought a quarrel without any reason? What really happened
during the six hours of an interrogation of which the police
made public only a few minutes of recording? Why was
Yang’s mother, the only person who knew the reasons behind
this tragedy, held in a lunatic asylum during the trial? The
tragedy experienced by Yang Jia was thus presented from a
completely different perspective: the 11 policemen who were
the victims in this case did not win popular sympathy. In re-
ality they were perceived, as was Yang Jia, as victims of the
present legal system, where abuses of power made possible
by the lack of control accentuate tensions between the police
and a population without sufficient recourse.
Thus one sees how the section of public opinion mobilised
by this case calls into question not only the death sentence
applied to the accused who had committed homicide, but
also what was felt to be a flagrant injustice in the administra-
tion of this penalty. The same situation recurred in the case
of Deng Yujiao in 2009. (48)
Conclus ion
It is hardly possible here to adequately go over the ambigu-
ities of the notion of minyi (public or popular opinion). It is
clear, however, that its role in the present debate on the
death penalty can have multiple and sometimes contradic-
tory meanings. At least three forms of it can be identified
today:
• A statistical and abstract form in “opinion polls” (minyi
ceyan): for example, according to a poll of 5,000 people
carried out in 1995 by the Institute of Legal Studies of the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on the question of
the number of death sentences in China today, close to
42.2 percent of the population considered it to be accept-
able, 31.48 percent perfectly justified, and 22.47 percent
still not high enough (not to mention the 0.78 percent to
whom all crimes should be punishable by death). (49) A
more recent poll of 16,000 internauts (2003), carried out
on the Internet, showed that 15.1 percent of respondents
were in favour of abolition of the death penalty, as against
83.3 percent who favoured its maintenance (1.6 percent
“didn’t know“). (50)
• A form of popular, emotional, and concrete mobilisation
that appears on the occasion of specific local problems;
• A more or less argued form expressed at the national level
in the media, and especially on the Internet, but which
one can but hesitate to call “public opinion” because of its
fragmentary character and because of the surveillance of
the government.
One can only offer a qualified assessment of this phenome-
non, but the examples examined above demonstrate how ap-
peals to public opinion can be instrumentalised by a policy
that is more populist than democratic. In particular, the role
played today by public opinion in the debate over the death
penalty highlights the necessity of the independence of the
judiciary. But this opinion, as we have seen, can also be a
means of rational criticism of the shortcomings and excesses
of the authorities. As such, the growing importance it is ac-
corded by the authorities, despite a deep ambiguity, can also
be seen as an encouraging sign in the direction of a possible
democratisation of Chinese political space. •
• Translated by Michael Black
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Zhao Bingzhi 趙秉志
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minfen de liangzhang lian 民憤的兩張臉  
jiti yishi 集體意識 
gongzhong qinggan 公眾情感
Liang Genlin 梁根林 
guanyi 官意
fayi 法意
Wang Shengjun 王勝俊 
Nandou zhoukan 南都週刊 
Zhang Jinzhu 張金柱
Liu Yong 劉湧 
She Xianglin 佘祥林
Yang Jia 楊佳 
ni bu gei wo yige shuofa, wo jiu gei ni yige shuofa 
你不給我一個說法，我就給你一個說法 
Deng Yujiao 鄧玉嬌
minyi ceyan 民意測驗
